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INTRODUCTION 
The Intellectual Property Clause of the Constitution states that 
“Congress shall have power . . . To promote the Progress of Science 
and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inven-
tors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries.”1  
Naturally, the impact of this Clause depends on the various meanings 
that are ascribed to its words.  This Comment focuses on the effect of 
attributing different meanings to the term “progress.”2 
“Progress,” in the context of Article I, Section 8, Clause 8 of the 
Constitution (“Intellectual Property Clause” or “Clause”), has gener-
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 1 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
 2 This Comment assumes that the “progress” component of the Intellectual Property 
Clause carries weight.  On several occasions, usually in the copyright context, this intro-
ductory phrase has been treated as a non-binding preamble and disregarded.  See, e.g., 
Eldred v. Reno, 239 F.3d 372 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (proclaiming that the introductory phrase 
of the Intellectual Property Clause is not a substantive limit on Congress’s power); 
MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 1.03[A] (2008) (“[T]he 
phrase ‘To promote the progress of science and useful arts . . . ’ must be read as largely in 
the nature of a preamble, indicating the purpose of the power but not in limitation of its 
exercise.”).  However, the majority of commentators take the position that this portion of 
the Clause not only provides a meaningful limitation on the congressional patent and 
copyright powers, but it also articulates the purpose of the Intellectual Property Clause as 
a whole, or in other words, the ends that are to be achieved.  See, e.g., Bonito Boats, Inc. v. 
Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141 (1989) (affirming that the introductory phrase of 
the Intellectual Property Clause does contribute meaning to the Clause in patent cases); 
Goldstein v. California, 412 U.S. 546, 555 (1973) (“[The Intellectual Property Clause] de-
scribes both the objective which Congress may seek and the means to achieve it.”); Law-
rence B. Solum, Congress’s Power to Promote the Progress of Science:  Eldred v. Ashcroft, 36 
LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1, 20 (2002) (“Congress is given power to pursue an end—promotion of 
science; and that power is limited by the specification of the means that Congress may 
employ—the securing to authors of the exclusive right to their writings for limited 
terms.”). 
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ally been understood to stand for the notion of “qualitative improve-
ment.”3  This can be at least partially explained by the fact that “im-
provement,” in terms of movement towards a particular goal, is the 
dominant definition for “progress” as the term is used today.4  Adopt-
ing this understanding for a moment, the introductory phrase of the 
Intellectual Property Clause can be alternatively stated as:  Congress 
has the power to encourage5 the improvement6 of learning7 and 
technology.8  Departing from the majority opinion, this Comment 
adds to the small but growing body of commentary that challenges 
the perception that “progress” refers to “qualitative improvement.”  
Instead, this Comment argues that the term, as it was used by the 
Framers in the late-eighteenth century, is more analogous to “dis-
semination.”  This understanding speaks to a more physical form of 
advancement, such as spatial movement or radial growth—for exam-
ple, the progress of a fire as it spreads through a house or the pro-
gress of civilization as it expands across the globe—rather than qual-
ity-based improvement, which is better represented by the notion of 
raising the bar. 
 
 3 See Solum, supra note 2, at 45 (“[T]he ‘Progress of Science’ would ordinarily be under-
stood as involving advances in learning or the continuation of scientific activity.”).  For 
the purposes of this Comment, it is assumed that the other words, most of which have be-
come terms of art, have the meanings ascribed to them by Solum in his article, Congress’s 
Power to Promote the Progress of Science:  Eldred v. Ashcroft.  Id. at 25–47.  See infra notes 5–8 
for the specific definitions of each term. 
 4 The American Heritage Dictionary has the following entry for “progress”: 
1. Movement, as toward a goal; advance. 
2. Development or growth:  students who show progress. 
3. Steady improvement, as of a society or civilization:  a believer in human pro-
gress. . . . 
4. A ceremonial journey made by a sovereign through his or her realm. 
  THE AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 1401 (4th ed. 2000). 
 5 See Solum, supra note 2, at 44 (stating that the relevant meaning of “promote” can be cap-
tured by the words “further,” “advance,” or “encourage,” and also noting that “[n]o con-
troversy has arisen with respect to the meaning of this particular term”). 
 6 See supra note 3 and accompanying text. 
 7 See Solum, supra note 2, at 51 (demonstrating that the historic usage of the term “science” 
was broader than how the term is used today, and how the term was used in the Framing 
era to indicate general knowledge and learning).  “Science” was used in the Intellectual 
Property Clause to refer to the copyright power, which explains its pairing with the terms 
“Authors” and “Writings.”  In contrast, “useful Arts” was used to refer to the patent power; 
it is intuitively paired with “Inventors” and “Discoveries.”  See infra note 8. 
 8 See Karl B. Lutz, Are the Courts Carrying Out Constitutional Public Policy on Patents?, 34 J. PAT. 
OFF. SOC’Y 766, 771 (1952) (“It is clear . . . that ‘useful arts’ meant what we now call 
‘technology,’ or ‘applied science.’”); see also Robert I. Coulter, The Field of Statutory Useful 
Arts, 34 J. PAT. OFF. SOC’Y 487, 496 (1952) (“It seems clear that ‘useful arts’ (as a unitary 
technical term) embraced the so-called industrial, mechanical and manual arts of the 
18th century . . . .”). 
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Part I investigates the original understanding of “progress.”  It be-
gins by looking for clues within the drafting process of the Intellec-
tual Property Clause during the Constitutional Convention.  Through 
this process, several conclusions can be made as to what “progress” 
was not intended to mean—namely “improvement.”  In its place, 
“progress” as “dissemination” is consistent with the common usage of 
the word during the Framing era.  Namely, progress was used most 
often in documents contemporary with the Constitution, such as the 
Pennsylvania Gazette and The Federalist Papers, to articulate the physical 
movements that we would, at present day, call “spread” or “dissemina-
tion.”  Thus, late eighteenth-century Americans reading the Intellec-
tual Property Clause would have understood the term to take on this 
meaning. 
Part I continues by examining the possible definitions of “pro-
gress” against the historical backdrop of patent law in several signifi-
cant periods:  (1) the colonial era, with a focus on the patent laws of 
Great Britain; (2) the Articles of Confederation period; and (3) the 
Framing era.  These periods saw a significant shift in the community’s 
understanding of the purpose served by establishing a patent regime.  
Patent laws began as a method of ensuring an influx of technology 
into an area.9  However, as the patent regime became more devel-
oped during the early and mid-eighteenth century, the philosophical 
justification for having an intellectual property system was sharply re-
defined.  By the Revolutionary War, patent law ideology had shifted 
from stressing the benefits obtained from the introduction of novel 
tangible goods, to emphasizing the benefits obtained from the enrich-
ment of public knowledge—in particular, the knowledge obtained from 
the introduction of information into the public domain when inven-
tors participate in the patent system.10  In other words, intellectual 
property theorists now viewed the advantage of having a patent re-
gime as being the spread of new information—not the production of 
new goods. 
 
 9 See PAMELA O. LONG, OPENNESS, SECRECY, AUTHORSHIP:  TECHNICAL ARTS AND THE 
CULTURE OF KNOWLEDGE FROM ANTIQUITY TO THE RENAISSANCE 93 (2001) (“A developing 
patent system gave glassmakers good reasons for leaving Venice to ply their trade else-
where. . . . The granting of limited monopolies enabled the state or city to pos-
sess . . . craft processes or inventions [to which they otherwise would not have had ac-
cess].”). 
 10 Similarly, in the copyright context the emphasis changed from the construction of the 
creative piece itself to the ability for others to access the piece.  See infra notes 71–74 and 
accompanying text. 
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This historical background is particularly telling.  When the 
Framers drafted the Intellectual Property Clause, they were not only 
using the term “progress” in the form that it was most commonly 
used during their time period, but they were also using it to convey a 
very specific idea concerning the societal function of intellectual 
property:  the importance of disclosure.  Put simply, their use of 
“progress” was deliberate.  It was intentionally penned to express the 
importance of dissemination as a means to facilitate access, increase 
the availability of information, and ultimately secure rights for the 
public. 
Part II analyzes the implications of reading “progress” as either 
“improvement” or “dissemination.”  Resolving the meaning of the In-
tellectual Property Clause is of paramount importance because many 
authorities having the power to shape patent law and policy look to-
wards the Clause in performing their functions.11  Additionally, 
judges12 and scholars13 reference the Clause as the basis for rendering 
decisions or formulating academic thought.  Thus, committing to a 
definition of “progress” as either “improvement” or “dissemination” is 
more than an academic exercise. 
This importance is especially pronounced when a proposed policy 
can be categorized as pro-goods but anti-information, or vice versa.  
Part II examines such situations—namely, local working require-
ments and compulsory licensing.  It begins by exploring the patent 
regime in India that existed until 2005, where local working require-
ments evinced a progress-as-improvement viewpoint.  This is con-
trasted with modern American patent law, where policies have largely 
been defined by a progress-as-dissemination viewpoint.  Notably, one 
of the key objectives pushed by the United States in treaty attempts to 
 
 11 See, e.g., Patent Reform Act of 2007, S. 1145, 110th Cong. (2007) (“The Constitution ex-
plicitly grants Congress the power to ‘promote the progress of science and useful 
arts[’]. . . . The object of the patent law today must remain true to the constitutional 
command . . . .”); FED. TRADE COMM’N, TO PROMOTE INNOVATION:  THE PROPER BALANCE 
OF COMPETITION AND PATENT LAW AND POLICY 15 (2003) (“The constitutional intention 
that patents ‘promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts’ should be taken into ac-
count in interpreting the scope of patentable subject matter under Section 101.”). 
 12 See, e.g., Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 535 U.S. 722, 730–31 
(2002) (“This clarity [of patent right boundaries] is essential to promote progress, be-
cause it enables efficient investment in innovation.”); Graham v. John Deere Co. of Kan. 
City, 383 U.S. 1, 5–6 (1966) (“The Congress in the exercise of the patent power may not 
overreach the restraints imposed by the stated constitutional purpose.  Nor may it enlarge 
the patent monopoly without regard to the innovation, advancement or social benefit 
gained thereby.”). 
 13 See infra note 16 and accompanying text. 
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create worldwide uniformity among intellectual property regimes was 
to combat policies that devalue the transfer of information in favor of 
the transfer of tangible goods.  Such policies included local working 
requirements and compulsory licensing like those used in India. 
Finally, this Comment examines the strange but recent emer-
gence of local working requirements and compulsory licensing within 
the American patent system.  This is a strong example of how an un-
guided approach to intellectual property policymaking can lead to 
conflicting policy results.  Without direction as to what goals the pat-
ent law should seek to achieve, this conflict may be inevitable.  This 
Comment suggests that policymakers should look to the Constitution 
and the meaning of “progress” to guide the future direction of patent 
law and reconcile policies that currently conflict.  In doing so, dis-
semination is the key. 
As a final introductory note, this Comment is focused mainly on 
the patent law component of intellectual property.14  However, both 
the patent and copyright regimes are derived from the Intellectual 
Property Clause and operate under the same general principle:  a 
limited legal entitlement in exchange for the creation or dissemina-
tion—depending on the particular view of “progress” adopted—of 
unique and novel articles.  As a result, most of the commentary can 
and should be applied with equal force to the copyright context. 
I.  DISCOVERING THE ORIGINAL UNDERSTANDING OF “PROGRESS” 
This Part looks toward finding the original understanding of the 
term “progress”—namely, what late eighteenth-century Americans 
reading the Constitution would have understood the term to mean.  
While original understanding is only one of several methodologies to 
find the constitutional significance of a clause, it is at least a viable 
starting point to discuss what goals modern patent policy should be 
advancing.15 
Until recently, there has not been much discussion concerning 
the meaning of the term “progress” as it applies to the Intellectual 
Property Clause.  The term has generally been accepted as meaning 
 
 14 However, some historical evidence from early copyright laws is provided in Part II.C to 
supplement the overall argument. 
 15 As discussed earlier, courts, policymakers, and commentators look towards the Intellec-
tual Property Clause when making decisions and formulating opinions.  See supra notes 
11–13 and accompanying text. 
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“qualitative or quantitative improvement in technology.”16  When in-
dividual commentators address the meaning of “progress,” they gen-
erally use this conventional meaning without explaining their reason-
ing for doing so or identifying why this definition is either 
appropriate or correct.17  This Part challenges this understanding by 
first discussing what “progress” was not intended to signify. 
A.  Negative Implications from the Rejected Proposals for the Intellectual 
Property Clause 
Many commentators have concluded that the original intent of 
the Intellectual Property Clause is impracticably difficult to discern.18  
 
 16 See ROBERT A. GOLDWIN, WHY BLACKS, WOMEN, AND JEWS ARE NOT MENTIONED IN THE 
CONSTITUTION AND OTHER UNORTHODOX VIEWS 37–41 (1990) (finding it disappointing 
that the Framers believed it would be appropriate to promote the progress of science 
through monetary incentives rather than education, and notably assuming that “pro-
gress” refers to “quality improvement”).  See generally In re Hogan, 559 F.2d 595, 606 
(C.C.P.A. 1977) (assuming that “progress” means “advancement in technology” when 
stating:  “To demand such restriction is merely to state a policy against broad protection 
for pioneer inventions, a policy both shortsighted and unsound from the standpoint of 
promoting progress in the useful arts, the constitutional purpose of the patent laws” (emphasis 
added)); Michael D. Birnhack, The Idea of Progress in Copyright Law, 1 BUFF. INTELL. PROP. 
L.J. 3, 7–22 (2001) (describing “progress” as the Enlightenment “idea of progress,” which 
constituted improvement in quality or quantity); Margaret Chon, Postmodern “Progress”:  
Reconsidering the Copyright and Patent Power, 43 DEPAUL L. REV. 97, 99 (1993) (“We can in-
fer from the term ‘Progress of Science and useful Arts’ an Enlightenment faith in knowl-
edge, whether it be knowledge for its own sake or for other ends.”); Heath W. Hoglund, 
Patent Fee Diversion Crosses Constitutional Boundary, 83 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 725, 
725 (2001) (asserting that “Congress’ power must be exercised in a way that promotes 
science and technological innovations,” thus analogizing the term “progress,” from the 
original constitutional grant, to “advancement”); Lutz, supra note 8, at 766 (arguing the 
same and “ascertain[ing] the true constitutional public policy on patents”); Arthur H. 
Seidel, The Constitution and a Standard of Patentability, 48 J. PAT. OFF. SOC’Y 5, 10 (“Diction-
aries contemporaneous to the authors of the Constitution teach that the phrase means to 
advance or forward the course or procession of the helpful trades.”); Solum, supra note 2, 
at 45 (“[T]he first Congress believed that the promotion of the progress of science meant 
encouragement of learning . . . .”). 
 17 See, e.g., ROBERT L. HARMON, PATENTS AND THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT § 1.2, at 11 (5th ed. 
2001) (claiming that patent rights are conferred “for the national purpose of advancing 
the useful arts—the process today called technological innovation”); Edward C. Walter-
scheid, To Promote the Progress of Science and Useful Arts:  The Background and Origin of the In-
tellectual Property Clause of the United States Constitution, 2 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 1, 52 (1994) 
(“[T]o promote the progress of useful arts presupposed an intent to advance or forward 
the course or procession of such trades.”). 
 18 See, e.g, EDWARD C. WALTERSCHEID, THE NATURE OF THE INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY CLAUSE:  
A STUDY IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 2 n.4 (2002) (“The substitution of ‘intellectual prop-
erty clause’ for ‘contract clause’ renders Leonard Levy’s pungent comments with respect 
to the contract clause highly apropos, namely:  ‘Original intent analysis of the [Intellec-
tual Property Clause] . . . does not quite resemble the empty page describing the sex life 
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This is largely because the Intellectual Property Clause was unani-
mously approved without debate.19  Additionally, the ratification de-
bates concerning the Constitution as a whole and the related litera-
ture barely mention the Clause.20  However, as Professor Dotan Oliar 
has demonstrated, the record that does exist from the committee 
drafting the Clause, however sparse, allows us to make at least some 
conclusions as to the intent of the Framers.21 
Oliar’s research into the history of the Intellectual Property 
Clause shows that within the committee charged with drafting the 
Clause, there were eight proposals that were each incorporated into 
the final result.22  A close examination of these proposals, specifically 
those from James Madison and Charles Pinckney, allows modern in-
vestigators to reconstruct the Framers’ intent.23 
 
of a steer, but scarcity of evidence makes the inquiry hardly more productive.  Almost no 
one cared about the [Intellectual Property Clause] either at the Constitutional Conven-
tion or during the ratification controversy.  Those advocating ratification and those op-
posed to it could not have been more apathetic than they were about the clause.’” (altera-
tions in original) (quoting LEONARD LEVY, ORIGINAL INTENT AND THE FRAMERS’ 
CONSTITUTION 124 (1988))). 
 19 See Malla Pollack, Purveyance and Power, or Over-Priced Free Lunch:  The Intellectual Property 
Clause as an Ally of the Takings Clause in the Public’s Control of Government, 30 SW. U. L. REV. 
1, 100 (2000) (“Like a modern jury verdict, the Intellectual Property Clause came out of a 
black box.  All we have is the input and the output.”); Edward C. Walterscheid, To Promote 
the Progress of Science and Useful Arts:  The Anatomy of a Congressional Power, 43 IDEA 1, 2 
(2002) (“[The Intellectual Property Clause] was first presented to the convention less 
than two weeks before it adjourned, and was unanimously approved without debate.”).  
Edward C. Walterscheid, a noted intellectual property historian, wrote: 
Since none of the delegate-proposed plans contained any reference to congres-
sional power over copyright and patent, the question naturally arises as to how the 
Intellectual Property Clause came to be included in the Constitution.  Little has 
been written on the point.  The reason for the dearth of commentary undoubtedly 
is that so little is actually known about how its inclusion came about.  Contempo-
raneous records such as Madison’s notes indicate that it was adopted nemine con-
tradicente and without debate. 
  Walterscheid, supra note 17, at 26 (footnote omitted). 
 20 See Malla Pollack, What Is Congress Supposed to Promote?:  Defining “Progress” in Article I, Sec-
tion 8, Clause 8 of the United States Constitution, or Introducing the Progress Clause, 80 NEB. L. 
REV. 754, 766 (2001) (“The Supreme Court has never purported to define the individual 
word “progress” in the Progress Clause.”). 
 21 See generally Dotan Oliar, Making Sense of the Intellectual Property Clause:  Promotion of Progress 
as a Limitation on Congress’s Intellectual Property Power, 94 GEO. L.J. 1771, 1810 (2006) 
(“While the accepted wisdom conjectures that the Framers did not intend the Progress 
Clause as a limitation, the process of the Clause’s framing . . . suggests that, in fact, the 
Progress Clause was intended as a limitation.” (footnote omitted)). 
 22 See id. at 1776 (“The Convention’s record reveals eight proposals for Congressional pow-
ers . . . which anticipate the eventual text and structure of the Clause.”). 
 23 See id. (“[E]xamining Madison and Pinckney’s initial proposals closely, along with other 
Convention proceedings and proximate historical events, makes it possible to reconstruct 
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Oliar used his research to show that the “progress” component of 
the Intellectual Property Clause was added as a substantive limitation 
on the “exclusive rights” component of that Clause.24  His overall ar-
gument is that negative implications can be derived from Madison 
and Pinckney’s proposals by noting what made it through to the final 
version, and what was ultimately rejected.  This Comment proposes 
that a different analysis can be conducted using this same approach.  
Using these same foundation materials and parallel reasoning, it is 
possible to elucidate what the Framers did not intend “progress” to 
mean. 
The term “progress” does not appear in any of the proposals au-
thored by Madison or Pinckney.  However, the words “advance-
ment,”25 “encouragement,”26 and “promotion”27 are found scattered 
within the proposals.  Borrowing Oliar’s logic, the Framers must have 
intended the term “progress” to mean something entirely different 
from advancement, encouragement, or promotion.  Otherwise, they 
would have simply used one of these terms, which were in the initial 
proposals.  In Oliar’s words but in a different context, “the Framers as 
a group changed the proposals before adopting them, suggesting dis-
agreement.”28 
Moreover, if the Framers had intended to incorporate the notion 
of “advancement,” “encouragement,” or “promotion”29 within the In-
 
the Framers’ intent regarding the Clause’s unique structure and the role of the Progress 
Clause within it.”). 
 24 See supra note 2 for a discussion of whether the introductory phrase of the Intellectual 
Property Clause acts as a substantive limitation on the Clause as a whole.  Oliar specifi-
cally argued that if the Framers had intended for the patent power to be unlimited, and 
especially not limited by the notion of “progress,” then they could have adopted a version 
of the Clause that is as unqualified as Madison or Pinckney’s proposals.  However, as we 
know, the final Intellectual Property Clause includes both a “progress” component and 
an “exclusive rights” component.  Oliar concluded that this change implies that the 
Framers rejected such unrestricted patent powers.  See Oliar, supra note 21, at 1811 
(“[T]he Framers as a group changed the proposals before adopting them, suggesting dis-
agreement.”). 
 25 This is found within Madison’s proposed encouragement power:  “To encourage, by 
proper præmiums and provisions, the advancement of useful knowledge and discoveries.”  
See Oliar, supra, at 1789. 
 26 This term is also found within Madison’s proposed encouragement power.  See id. 
 27 This term is included in Pinckney’s proposed education power:  “To establish seminaries 
for the promotion of literature and the arts and sciences.”  See id. 
 28 Id. at 1811. 
 29 Pollack argues that all of these terms (“advancement,” “encouragement,” and “promo-
tion”) essentially refer to an improvement in quality or quantity.  See Pollack, supra note 
20, at 790 (“My research evidences that an eighteenth century writer of English who 
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tellectual Property Clause, they could have easily done so by omitting 
the word “progress” altogether:  the leading term “promote”30 already 
captured these ideas.  The Framers chose instead to include the word 
“progress.”  Thus, their use of “progress” within the Intellectual 
Property Clause was not for the purpose of calling for the “advance-
ment,” “encouragement,” or “promotion” of science and the useful 
arts.  They were hoping to invoke something entirely different.  The 
next subsection develops what that definition could be. 
B.  Linguistic Evidence Within Documents Contemporary with the 
Constitution 
Linguistic evidence provides a useful starting point for analyzing 
the original understanding of the term “progress” as it is used within 
the Intellectual Property Clause.  This subsection reviews work that 
has already been conducted by other commentators on the subject.  
The work of these commentators is based on the thesis that the 
meaning of the term “progress” as it is used in the Intellectual Prop-
erty Clause is best informed by the most common usage of the word 
during the Framing era. 
1.  The Pennsylvania Gazette 
In her search for original meaning, Pollack observed that conven-
tional starting points were unhelpful.  First, she noted that the term 
“progress” is not used anywhere else in the entirety of the Constitu-
tion,31 and thus it is not possible to look at other uses of the word 
within the same text to glean its meaning.  Similarly, “progress” is not 
used within the historical predecessors to the Intellectual Property 
Clause,32 namely the English Statute of Monopolies33 and the Statute 
 
wanted to indicate a desire for qualitative improvement would have been more likely to 
use some form of ‘improvement,’ ‘perfection,’ or ‘advancement.’” (footnotes omitted)). 
 30 As in, “Congress shall have Power . . . To promote the Progress of Science and useful 
Arts . . . .”  U.S. CONST. art I, § 8, cl. 8 (emphasis added). 
 31 See Pollack, supra note 20, at 766 n.60 (“This Clause is the only use of the word ‘progress’ 
in the Constitution.”). 
 32 See id. at 782 (“[T]he historical precursors of the Progress Clause do not use the same 
language.”). 
 33 The 1624 English Statute of Monopolies has been recognized as the forerunner to 
American patent law.  See Malla Pollack, The Multiple Unconstitutionality of Business Method 
Patents:  Common Sense, Congressional Consideration, and Constitutional History, 28 RUTGERS 
COMPUTER & TECH. L.J. 61, 91 (2002) (“The Intellectual Property Clause of the Constitu-
tion is a descendent of the 1624 English Statute of Monopolies . . . .”); Richard H. Stern, 
Scope-of-Protection Problems with Patents and Copyrights on Methods of Doing Business, 10 
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of Anne.34  Finally, she observed that the Supreme Court has never 
formally defined the term in the context of the Intellectual Property 
Clause.35  With these sources unavailable, Pollack opted instead to 
look towards a document contemporary with the Constitution:  the 
Pennsylvania Gazette.  She posited that since “‘progress’ is not a tech-
nical word of the legal art, . . . the word usage of the Pennsylvania Ga-
zette [is] the best currently available evidence of what 1789 American 
residents would have understood from the word ‘progress’ in the [In-
tellectual Property] Clause.”36 
Pollack searched the surviving issues of the Pennsylvania Gazette37 
and overwhelmingly found that the most common usage of the word 
was in the context of describing what we would refer to today as the 
“spread” of a destructive force.38  From these results, she argued that 
“[t]his pattern of use is inconsistent with the persistent assumption 
that in colonial North America ‘progress’ meant ‘qualitative im-
 
FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 105, 149 n.169 (1999) (acknowledging that 
the patent system is “ultimately based” on the Statute of Monopolies); Edward C. Walter-
scheid, Defining the Patent and Copyright Term:  Term Limits and the Intellectual Property Clause, 
7 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 315, 336 (2000) (discussing the Statute of Monopolies as “an antece-
dent . . . for the Intellectual Property Clause”); cf. Graham v. John Deere Co. of Kan. City, 
383 U.S. 1, 5 (1966) (describing the Intellectual Property Clause as having been “written 
against the backdrop of practices—eventually curtailed by the Statute of Monopolies—of 
the Crown in granting monopolies to court favorites in goods or businesses which had 
long before been enjoyed by the public”). 
 34 The English Statute of Anne is the recognized precursor to American copyright statutes.  
See 1 PAUL GOLDSTEIN, COPYRIGHT § 1.13.1, at 1:27 (2d ed. 2000). 
 35 See Pollak, supra note 20, at 766 (“The Supreme Court has never purported to define the 
individual word ‘progress’ in the Progress Clause.”); John R. Therien, Exorcising the Specter 
of a “Pay-Per-Use” Society:  Toward Preserving Fair Use and the Public Domain in the Digital Age, 
16 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 979, 995 (2001) (“[C]ourts have been loath to give any explicit 
content to the term ‘Progress.’”). 
 36 Pollack, supra note 20, at 798.  In the same paragraph, Pollack heralded the Pennsylvania 
Gazette as “the New York Times of the American colonies.”  Id.  She later noted that “the 
text of the proposed federal Constitution, the Federalist Papers, and numerous other ratifi-
cation discussions were printed in the Pennsylvania Gazette.”  Id. at 799. 
 37 See id. at 798.  Specifically, she “ran a full text search for just that one word in all existing 
issues of the Pennsylvania Gazette printed from its inception through the end of the eight-
eenth century.  [She] located 575 uses of the word ‘progress.’”  Id. 
 38 Id. at 799 (“By far, the most common use of ‘progress’ was for destructive physical move-
ment.  The single most common word in the phrase ‘the progress of . . . ’ is ‘fire.’  The 
Gazette speaks of the ‘progress of a fire’ when a modern newspaper would report its 
‘spread.’  Fifty-one times fire made a ‘progress’ through some human construction, such 
as a house.  Eighty-five times the geographical ‘progress’ was by an armed man, group of 
men, or an entire army—quite often the enemy’s troops.  Thirteen times some illness 
made a ‘progress.’  The Gazette also reported the ‘progress’ of other destructive entities—
such as ravenous insects, bad weather, and possibly hostile ships.” (omission in original) 
(footnotes omitted)). 
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provement.’”39  Instead, she concluded that “‘progress’ was over-
whelming [sic] used to mean something other than qualitative im-
provement. . . . The most common usage was ‘spread,’ or some other 
type of physical movement.”40 
2.  The Federalist Papers 
Senator Hatch and Professor Lee proceeded under the same fun-
damental logic as Pollack—that the original understanding of the 
word “progress” provides the best insight into the role that the term 
plays within the Intellectual Property Clause, and that the best way to 
discern the original meaning is through evaluating the term’s use 
within Framing-era texts.  Their work centered instead on The Federal-
ist Papers, which, due to the fact that they were authored by the Fram-
ers themselves, arguably makes this approach more directly corre-
lated with original meaning. 
Hatch and Lee conducted a full-text search of The Federalist and 
found results consistent with Pollack’s.41  Namely, they found that the 
predominant use of “progress” within The Federalist was in reference 
to “physical advancement,” “physical movement,” and “spread,” often 
of some destructive force.42  For example, Federalist No. 8, authored by 
Alexander Hamilton, spoke of the “rapid desolation which used to 
mark the progress of war.”43 
C.  Evidence from the Historical Context of Eighteenth Century Intellectual 
Property Thought 
Pollack, Hatch, and Lee’s arguments have been challenged on the 
grounds that even if the most common meaning of the term “pro-
gress” was “spread” or “dissemination,” it does not necessarily mean 
that the Framers used the word in that particular context within the 
 
 39 Id. 
 40 Id. at 803. 
 41 See Orrin G. Hatch & Thomas R. Lee, “To Promote the Progress of Science”:  The Copyright 
Clause and Congress’s Power to Extend Copyrights, 16 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 1, 8 (2002) (“A full-
text search for ‘progress’ in the electronic version of The Federalist papers reveals twenty-
four instances of the word in this important work.”). 
 42 See id. at 8–9 (“The predominant use of the term in The Federalist is in reference to an ad-
vancement or movement, as in a physical or metaphorical journey. . . . Most of the other 
uses of the term in The Federalist also connote physical movement or ‘spread,’ often of 
some mechanism of destruction.”). 
 43 THE FEDERALIST No. 8, at 61 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 2003). 
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Intellectual Property Clause.44  This subsection addresses these con-
cerns by providing context to the word “progress,” showing that “pro-
gress” as “dissemination” had a very particular meaning in the field of 
patents during the eighteenth century.  Therefore, the Framers not 
only used the word in its most common form, but they used it par-
ticularly to address a specific concept of intellectual property—
disclosure. 
The American intellectual property system had developed by 
178745 to the point where policy makers, courts, and learned indi-
viduals believed that the value of the intellectual property regime was 
in providing access to new ideas, rather than the production or avail-
ability of a finished product.  In other words, the commodity that in-
tellectual property law was producing was information, not goods.  This 
was a significant shift from the previous understanding in which the 
intellectual property system was believed beneficial solely because it 
introduced new products, arts, and literature to society,46 whether ho-
listically or through encouraging foreign craftsmen and guild mem-
bers to import technologies into a country.47 
Many commentators attribute this paradigm shift to the English 
case Liardet v. Johnson,48 which was authored by the celebrated judge 
Lord Mansfield in 1778.  The case is often viewed as marking a turn-
ing point in the way people thought about patents.49  It demonstrated 
“a major change in the economic role of patents, for it shifted the 
emphasis from the introduction of finished products into commerce 
to the new and useful information to the technical arts.”50  Lord Mans-
field’s decision posited that the social good of providing a patent sys-
tem is not in the provision of novel technologies, but the contribu-
 
 44 See infra note 95 and accompanying text. 
 45 1787 being the year of the Constitutional Convention. 
 46 See ROBERT P. MERGES & JOHN F. DUFFY, PATENT LAW AND POLICY:  CASES AND MATERIALS 6 
(4th ed. 2007) (“Under the original patent systems, society’s benefit was the introduction 
of a new art or technology into the country.”). 
 47 See, e.g., id. at 4–5 (“The chief minister under Elizabeth I, William Cecil (Lord Burghley), 
used patent grants as an inducement for foreign artisans to bring continental technolo-
gies into England.”). 
 48 There is no official report of this case.  However, there are several indirect records that 
exist due to contemporary accounts by observers.  See, e.g., Liardet v. Johnson, (1780) 62 
Eng. Rep. 1000 (K.B.).  Specific language in this case is further discussed in the following 
subsection, detailing direct evidence from the British patent and copyright systems of this 
shift in paradigm.  See infra Part I.C.1. 
 49 Edward C. Walterscheid provides a good account of the history of the case.  See  Edward 
C. Walterscheid, The Early Evolution of the United States Patent Law:  Antecedents (Part 3), 77 J. 
PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 771 (1995). 
 50 MERGES & DUFFY, supra note 46, at 257. 
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tion of information and know-how to technological fields.  This was 
novel in that it shifted the emphasis away from the tangible goods 
themselves. 
As a result of this shift in emphasis, patent law has come to be de-
scribed as a contract between the inventor and society.51  In exchange 
for the right to exclude others from use of the subject matter de-
scribed within the patent, the inventor must fully disclose to the pub-
lic all of the fundamental aspects of the invention.  In this way, society 
gains access to the inventive concepts during the patent term and the 
ability to freely use the innovation after the expiration of the term.  
This allows society to further develop and improve upon the inventive 
concepts, and identify means by which these concepts can be de-
signed around to achieve the same result. 
This idea of a contract became increasingly prevalent in the litera-
ture as well as in judicial decisions being published at the time; it was 
also reflected in policies and statutes.52  This Comment argues that it 
was reflected as well in the Constitution, through the use of the term 
“progress” in the Intellectual Property Clause.  This change in out-
look was substantiated by evidence from the British patent and copy-
right systems that were in place during the colonial period through 
the Framing era,53 state copyright provisions that were enacted during 
the Articles of Confederation period,54 and judicial and policy state-
ments made during the Framing era or soon after.55 
1.  The British Patent System 
Developments in the British intellectual property system before 
and during the Framing era provide valuable insights into the mind-
set of the Framers regarding intellectual property.  As a former Brit-
 
 51 See generally Vincenzo Denicolò & Luigi A. Franzoni, The Contract Theory of Patents, 23 INT’L 
REV. L. & ECON. 365 (2004).  Later on in the century, jurists and scholars began describ-
ing this concept as a quid pro quo.  See, e.g., AK Steel Corp. v. Sollac, 344 F.3d 1234, 1244 
(Fed. Cir. 2003) (“[A]s part of the quid pro quo of the patent bargain, the applicant’s 
specification must enable one of ordinary skill in the art to practice the full scope of the 
claimed invention.”); Jeanne C. Fromer, Patent Disclosure, 94 IOWA L. REV. 539, 553 (2009) 
(“The accepted understanding in patent policy and doctrine is that disclosure of a pat-
ented invention to the public—and its dedication to the public after expiration of the 
patent term—is part of a quid pro quo the patentee must provide to gain the broad patent 
right.”).  This terminology was not used during the colonial period or the Framing era, 
though. 
 52 See infra notes 53–55. 
 53 See infra Part I.C.1. 
 54 See infra Part I.C.2. 
 55 See infra Part I.C.3. 
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ish colony, it was natural for a young United States to look towards 
England’s patent system as a starting point to create its own.  In fact, 
the British patent and copyright systems became the basis for the sys-
tems enacted within the several States during the Articles of Confed-
eration period.56  Later, they were the inspiration for the Intellectual 
Property Clause of the Constitution,57 and the federal patent and 
copyright statutes enacted by Congress soon after ratification.  More 
specific to this Comment, scholars have maintained that early Ameri-
cans embraced England’s new-found emphasis on the importance of 
disclosure within their own patent laws.58 
As referenced earlier, Liardet v. Johnson59 has often been cited as a 
decision signaling the transition from a products-oriented paradigm 
in England to one in which information—and access to that informa-
tion—is paramount.  Liardet’s fame is attributed to Lord Mansfield’s 
declaration that a patent should be invalidated if the specification 
fails to fully and adequately describe how to make and use the inven-
tion claimed in the patent.60  As a result, the role of the specification 
in English patent law was considerably strengthened.61 
Many scholars have heralded the decision as being a significant 
turning point that was crucial to the development of modern patent 
law.62  Others have argued instead that Liardet was not the landmark 
that it is often made out to be, as it was actually the culmination of 
more holistic seventeenth and eighteenth-century developments in 
patent law.63  Either way, scholars agree that by the end of the eight-
 
 56 See e.g., MERGES & DUFFY, supra note 46, at 7 (“Patents were among the many British legal 
concepts introduced to the American colonies between 1640 and 1776.”). 
 57 Walterscheid, supra note 17, at 3 (“The Framers drafted the Intellectual Property Clause 
against the immediate backdrop of the Articles of Confederation but within the overall 
framework of the English, colonial, and state practices regarding patents and copy-
right.”); see also supra note 33. 
 58 See Walterscheid, supra note 49, at 777 (“[I]t would be the English practice [of requiring 
disclosure through a specification] that would come to be relied on in the early develop-
ment of the American patent law.”). 
 59 See supra note 48 and accompanying text. 
 60 See Walterscheid, supra note 49, at 796–97 (discussing the impact of Liardet v. Johnson). 
 61 See id. at 792 n.99 (“As early as 1732 a patent was voided for failure to have a specification 
that set forth the nature of the invention.”). 
 62 See E. Wyndham Hume, On the Consideration of the Patent Grant, Past and Present, 13 LAW Q. 
REV. 313, 317 (1897) (“Liardet v. Johnson [was] a trial which may be regarded as a land-
mark in the history of English patent law . . . .”). 
 63 See John N. Adams & Gwen Averley, The Patent Specification:  The Role of Liardet v. Johnson, 
7 J. LEGAL HIST. 156 (1986) (arguing that Liardet v. Johnson was not as revolutionary as 
other scholars have suggested and that the English patent system had long been shifting 
towards a more specification-focused doctrine); see also Walterscheid, supra note 49, at 792 
(“[A]s the [eighteenth] century progressed, an at times subtle but nonetheless clear tran-
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eenth century, the English patent system was primarily disclosure-
focused rather than products-oriented.64  This can be seen in late 
eighteenth-century English decisions such as Turner v. Winter in 1787, 
where it was avowed that “[t]he consideration, which the patentee 
gives for his monopoly, is the benefit which the public are [sic] to de-
rive from his invention after his patent is expired:  and that benefit is 
secured to them by means of a specification of the invention.”65  In 
1795, it was concluded in Boulton v. Bull that “[t]he specification is 
the price which the patentee is to pay for the monopoly.”66 
Finally, a paper written by English scholar John Clennel at the 
turn of the nineteenth century explored the importance of disclosure 
and public accessibility of information to innovation.  The author be-
gan by cataloguing “inventions [that had been] lost to the world 
through non-disclosure, and assert[ed] that the progress of science 
through the eighteenth century was [achieved] through disclosure.”67  
This demonstrates the ongoing resilience and robustness of the con-
tract paradigm in England through the Framing era. 
2.  State Copyright Law During the Articles of Confederation Period 
The effect of the English focus on disclosure and dissemination of 
information is reflected in early American intellectual property stat-
utes that were enacted during the Articles of Confederation period.  
This subsection deals with early state copyright statutes.  However, the 
patent and copyright doctrines were viewed as highly related during 
that period, and this view prevails today.68  Thus, an emphasis on dis-
 
sition with regard to the crown’s views on the consideration for the patent grant oc-
curred.  Specifically, the crown came increasingly to recognize that working the invention 
was no longer the consideration for the grant, but that instead wider dissemination of 
new skills to the public in general should be the desideratum.”). 
 64 See Adams & Averley, supra note 63, at 169 (discussing the notion during late-eighteenth 
century England that “[a] patent [was] an agreement between the King and the inventor 
that the subject will put the public in possession of a useful secret”); Walterscheid, supra 
note 49, at 801 (“Liardet v. Johnson led the way, but by the end of the century it had be-
come settled law that the consideration for the patent was not the working of the inven-
tion per se but rather the disclosure of how to make and use it in the specification.”). 
 65 (1787) 99 Eng. Rep. 1274, 1276 (K.B.). 
 66 (1795) 126 Eng. Rep. 651, 656 (C.P.). 
 67 See Adams & Averley, supra note 63, at 170 (emphasis added) (discussing John Clennel’s 
Expediency of Disclosing the Process of Manufacturies, written in 1807 and presented to the 
Literary and Philosophical Society of Newcastle upon Tyne). 
 68 See, e.g., Adam MacLuckie, Comment, United States v. Microsoft:  A Look at the Balancing 
Act Between Copyright Protection for Software, Intellectual Property Rights and the Sherman Anti-
trust Act, 2 HOUS. BUS. & TAX L.J. 415, 429–31 (2002) (stating that “patents and copyrights 
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semination in the copyright context reflects an analogous belief that 
dissemination is important in the patent context. 
In 1783, the Continental Congress issued a resolution recom-
mending that copyright laws be enacted in each State.  In its state-
ment, the Continental Congress reported that it was “persuaded 
that . . . the protection and security of literary property would greatly 
tend to encourage genius, [and] to promote useful discover-
ies . . . [in] arts and commerce.”69  As a result, twelve States enacted 
copyright statutes during the Articles of Confederation period.70  The 
structure and content of these statutes demonstrate that intellectual 
property law was focused on the dissemination of information, rather 
than the creation of products, literature, or art. 
Five of the early copyright statutes during this period included a 
provision for voiding an author’s copyright if sufficient copies of a 
work were not made locally available at reasonable prices.71  This 
condition demonstrates that during the Articles of Confederation pe-
riod, the purpose of the copyright provisions was to spread an au-
thor’s work and to ensure that it was made accessible.  Failure to dis-
seminate one’s work was enough to void the privilege of a copyright. 
Also notable, the prefaces of the copyright statutes enacted by 
Connecticut, Georgia, New Hampshire, and New York all stated that 
the purpose of the provisions was to “encourage men of learning and 
genius to publish their writings.”72  Thus, these laws emphasized publi-
cation of works, rather than mere creation.73  Presumably, creation 
was not enough to ensure public access to a work, and therefore 
merely creating a piece was not enough to merit the conferral of 
 
are similar in many respects” and listing commonalities); Louis L. Wu, Comment, En-
hanced Damages for Willful Patent Infringement—An Issue for Judge or Jury?, 33 U.S.F. L. REV. 
435, 447–48 (1999) (discussing the similarities between patents and copyrights as forms 
of intellectual property and arguing that due to shared features, both should be treated 
similarly).  This linkage is also demonstrated by the fact that the Framers later chose to 
confer both copyright and patent powers in the same breath:  the Intellectual Property 
Clause. 
 69 Walterscheid, supra note 17, at 20 (citation omitted). 
 70 See Irah Donner, The Copyright Clause of the U.S. Constitution:  Why Did the Framers Include It 
with Unanimous Approval?, 36 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 361, 374 (1992); L. Ray Patterson, Copy-
right Overextended:  A Preliminary Inquiry into the Need for a Federal Statute of Unfair Competi-
tion, 17 U. DAYTON L. REV. 385, 404 (1992). 
 71 See Pollack, supra note 20, at 786 (“[F]ive [of the early copyright statutes] make provision 
for overriding the author’s privilege if he fails to make sufficient copies of his work avail-
able locally at reasonable prices.”). 
 72 See Hatch & Lee, supra note 41, at 11 (emphasis added). 
 73 See id. at 10–11 (“[M]any of the state laws spoke of encouraging the publication of works, 
not of their creation.”). 
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copyright privileges.74  Publication was a more definite basis to ensure 
at least some extent of dissemination. 
Altogether, this evidence demonstrates that England’s fixation on 
dissemination of information had come to America prior to the Con-
stitutional Convention.  As the next subsection demonstrates, this 
paradigm continued to prevail past the Framing era. 
3.  The Framing Period and Beyond 
One of the first sources that constitutional law scholars look to-
wards to discern intent when the Constitution provides ambiguous 
answers is The Federalist Papers.75  However, the only mention of the In-
tellectual Property Clause in The Federalist76 does not speak to the 
meaning of “progress.”  The passage that references patents and 
copyrights states: 
The utility of this power will scarcely be questioned.  The copyright of au-
thors has been solemnly adjudged, in Great Britain, to be a right of 
common law.  The right to useful inventions seems with equal reason to 
belong to the inventors.  The public good fully coincides in both cases 
with the claims of individuals.77 
Accordingly, this is not an appropriate source to discern the opera-
tion of the term “progress” in patent and copyright law.  This Com-
ment looks instead towards other available sources from the Framing 
era. 
While there are no Supreme Court cases available concerning in-
tellectual property during the Framing era for obvious reasons,78 deci-
sions from the period immediately following ratification directly in-
voke the quid pro quo paradigm by depicting the patent system as a 
 
 74 Creation is distinct from publication.  Creation of a piece occurs as soon as the creative 
work is fixed on a tangible medium.  Publication, in contrast, requires active steps to be 
taken towards public exposure of the creative piece.  Diaries and letters, for example, are 
created but not published.  They would not be eligible for copyright protection under 
these early statutes. 
 75 But see James W. Ducayet, Publius and Federalism:  On the Use and Abuse of The Federalist in 
Constitutional Interpretation, 68 N.Y.U. L. REV. 821, 821–22, 824–25 (1993) (objecting to the 
overuse of and excessive reliance on The Federalist Papers in constitutional interpretation). 
 76 “[A]ll the commentary set forth in The Federalist concerning the content of the Constitu-
tion, that with respect to the intellectual property clause, is among the briefest.”  
WALTERSCHEID, supra note 18, at 2. 
 77 THE FEDERALIST NO. 43 (James Madison), supra note 43, at 268. 
 78 Neither the Supreme Court nor the federal patent and copyright statutes existed until 
after the ratification of the Constitution. 
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contract between the individual inventor and society.79  These deci-
sions, which could be described as within the Framing generation, 
showcase the Framers’ patent philosophies.  In Evans v. Eaton,80 the 
Supreme Court stated that the purpose of the specification require-
ment of the patent system “is to make known the manner of con-
structing the machine (if the invention is of a machine) so as to en-
able artizans to make and use it, and thus to give the public the full benefit 
of the discovery after the expiration of the patent.”81  This language identi-
fies the disclosure requirement as the source of the public’s benefit 
from the patent system.  Grant v. Raymond,82 a subsequent Supreme 
Court decision, similarly refers to the disclosure requirement as a 
fundamental underpinning of patent law.  The Court made several 
references to the contract metaphor, stating: 
To promote the progress of useful arts, is the interest and policy of every 
enlightened government. . . . The laws which are passed to give effect to 
this purpose ought, we think, to be construed in the spirit in which they 
have been made; and to execute the contract fairly on the part of the 
United States, where the full benefit has been actually received. . . . The 
public yields nothing which it has not agreed to yield; it receives all which 
it has contracted to receive.83 
Thus, the Supreme Court during the Framing generation had fully 
endorsed the contract paradigm of patent law which prioritizes the 
generation of information over the generation of new products. 
Pennock v. Dialogue84 offers additional support, albeit indirectly.  
The case stands for the proposition that an inventor cannot use trade 
secrets to protect an innovation until that strategy becomes inconven-
ient, and then apply for patent protection.85  For patent rights to be 
appropriate, the inventor must patent and disclose immediately.86  To 
reach this result, the court reasoned: 
If an inventor should be permitted to hold back from the knowledge of 
the public the secrets of his invention; if he should for a long period of 
years retain the monopoly, and make, and sell his invention publicly, and 
thus gather the whole profits of it, relying upon his superior skill and 
 
 79 More recent patent law cases have continued to emphasize this theme.  See, e.g., J.E.M. Ag. 
Supply, Inc. v. Pioneer Hi-Bred Int’l, Inc., 534 U.S. 124, 142 (2001) (“The disclosure re-
quired by the Patent Act is ‘the quid pro quo of the right to exclude.’” (citing Kewanee Oil 
Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 484 (1974))). 
 80 20 U.S. (7 Wheat.) 356 (1822). 
 81 Id. at 433–34 (emphasis added). 
 82 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 218 (1832). 
 83 Id. at 241–42. 
 84 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 1 (1829). 
 85 Id. 
 86 Id. 
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knowledge of the structure; and then, and then only, when the danger of 
competition should force him to secure the exclusive right, he should be 
allowed to take out a patent, and thus exclude the public from any far-
ther use than what should be derived under it during his fourteen years; 
it would materially retard the progress of science and the useful arts, and give a 
premium to those who should be least prompt to communicate their discoveries.87 
The emphasized phrase would not make sense in light of the rest of 
the statement if “progress” meant a “qualitative improvement” in 
technology.  In this case, the technology at issue had already been 
improved by the invention.  In fact, the public had the ability to pur-
chase the invention for several years prior to the patent application.  
If we allow an applicant to patent an invention after a significant pe-
riod of selling his or her product, “progress” can only be retarded if 
we understand “progress” to mean “dissemination of information” 
and the ability of the public to access this information.  Certainly, a 
qualitative improvement to a technological innovation cannot be un-
done by a postdated patent application.  It would therefore be non-
sensical for “progress” to mean an “advancement in technology” in 
this context.  However, allowing such a postdated application would 
delay public access to the innovative concepts (as opposed to the in-
novative product), and the ability of the public to use this knowledge.  
“Progress,” in this instance, can only mean “spread” or “dissemina-
tion.”  Most notably, the Supreme Court directly quoted from the 
Constitution in its mention of “progress.” 88  Therefore, it can be con-
cluded that the Court was speaking of “progress” in a constitutional 
sense. 
The first patent statute, which was passed in 1790,89 provides fur-
ther evidence of the emphasis on the spread of ideas.  It did not re-
quire patent applicants to have made the apparatus they were claim-
ing to have invented in the application.90  Further, the patent system 
 
 87 Id. at 19 (emphasis added). 
 88 Specifically, the Court stated “the main object [of patent law] was ‘to promote the pro-
gress of science and useful arts;’ and this could be done best, by giving the public at large 
a right to make, construct, use, and vend the thing invented.”  Id. 
 89 See P.J. Federico, The First Patent Act, 14 J. PAT. OFF. SOC’Y 237, 238 (1932) (“The [first] 
patent act was passed and was approved by the President on April 10, 1790.”).  Interest-
ingly, Rhode Island ratified the Constitution on May 29, 1790.  Thus, the first patent stat-
ute came before the United States had its thirteenth State. 
 90 Instead, only a model was required to supplement the application.  The first patent stat-
ute stated: 
And be it further enacted, That the grantee or grantees of each patent shall, at the 
time of granting . . . , deliver to the Secretary of State a specification in writing, 
containing a description, accompanied with drafts or models, and explanations 
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has never required an applicant to produce or sell the invention after 
issuance, or otherwise use the patent to tangible ends.91  Taken alto-
gether, the patent system does not require the inventor to ever make 
the invention described in the patent, present it, use it, or sell it.  In 
contrast, the patent system has always required disclosure, a complete 
and enabling specification, and public access to that information af-
ter the patent’s issuance.92  These considerations support the notion 
that the actual technology and finished product were merely secon-
dary goals of the patent system—the primary goal was publication 
and spread of knowledge. 
Interestingly, the first American patent treatise, which was pub-
lished in 1810, directly supports the paradigm that patents are a trade 
in information and not actual products.  It states: 
It will not impeach the validity of a patent that another first made the 
discovery, which is the subject of it, if in truth, the patentee were the first 
to make it public; for it was the disclosure of new inventions which the statute 
meant to encourage.  It is therefore a provision, and indispensable condi-
tion in all patents, that the patentee shall ascertain the nature of his in-
 
and models . . . of the thing or things, by him or them invented or discovered, and 
described as aforesaid, in the said patents . . . . 
  Patent Act of 1790, ch. 7, § 2, 1 Stat. 109–112 (1790).  It was enough that the applicant 
had experimented to the point where a finished product could be made.  The key ques-
tion was whether the application had enough content to enable one skilled in the art to 
make and use the claimed invention without undue experimentation, rather than 
whether the applicant had him or herself created a finished product: 
[The] specification shall be so particular, and said models so exact, as not only to 
distinguish the invention or discovery from other things before known and used, 
but also to enable a workman or other person skilled in the art or manufac-
ture, . . . to make, construct, or use the same, to the end that the public may have the 
full benefit thereof, after the expiration of the patent term . . . . 
  Id. (emphasis added). 
 91 See id. (omitting a requirement that applicant use his or her instructions to recreate the 
invention, but rather merely requiring that “a workman or other person skilled in the art 
or manufacture” be able to do so).  Notably, the current system also does not require the 
inventor to have made the invention at the time of application; it also does not require an 
inventor to ever use, create, or sell the patented product.  See 35 U.S.C. § 111-22 (2000) 
(specifying the requirements for a successful patent application). 
 92 Currently, most patent applications are published after eighteen months of filing unless 
the patentee expressly elects for it not to be published and forfeits the ability to apply for 
patents in other countries.  See 35 U.S.C. § 122 (2000) (“[E]ach application for a patent 
shall be published, in accordance with procedures determined by the Director, promptly 
after the expiration of a period of 18 months from the earliest filing date for which a 
benefit is sought under this title.”).  This only maintains the confidential status of the ap-
plication until the patent issues.  In the event of abandonment, the application remains 
confidential.  Id. 
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vention, and in what manner it is to be performed.  The specification is the 
price which the patentee is to pay for his monopoly.93 
The emphasis on disclosure as payment for a patent monopoly94 is di-
rectly aligned with Lord Mansfield’s opinion in Liardet.  Further, the 
concept that prior private use by another individual will not negate a 
finding of novelty for an applicant is notable.  The fact that someone 
else has previously created the product, even if privately, shows that 
the patentee him or herself did not advance technology.  If the pat-
ent system were focused on the improvement of technology merely 
for the sake of advancement, it would not reward such an applicant 
with a patent.  However, the patent system in 1810 was information-
focused.  The fact that an applicant is the one who has disclosed the 
information publicly makes him or her deserving of the patent grant.  
In essence, this stresses the notion that the patent system was enacted 
to encourage public disclosure, rather than merely advancement of 
technology.  This treatise was released in 1810, roughly twenty years 
after the Framers met in the Constitutional Convention.  Thus, this 
document is one of the best pieces of evidence showing that during 
the Framing era, it was not improvements in technology but the pub-
lic availability of information that was viewed as the benefit of a pat-
ent system. 
D.  The Original Understanding of “Progress” 
As mentioned earlier, Pollack’s work was criticized on the basis 
that even if the most common usage of the word “progress” was to 
express an idea of “spread” or “dissemination,” it does not necessarily 
follow that the Framers used the term in this manner within the con-
text of the Intellectual Property Clause.95  Namely, the criticism was 
that common usage does not take into account the context and cir-
cumstances of patent law during that time.96  This Part has sought to 
 
 93 THOMAS G. FESSENDEN, AN ESSAY ON THE LAW OF PATENTS FOR NEW INVENTIONS 48–49 
(1st ed. 1810) (emphases added). 
 94 Modern literature dissociates the direct linkage between a patent and a monopoly.  For 
an economic explanation as to why in most cases it is incorrect to say that a patent is a 
conferral of a monopoly power, see Kenneth W. Dam, The Economic Underpinnings of Patent 
Law, 23 J. LEGAL STUD. 247, 250 (1994). 
 95 See Solum, supra note 2, at 46–47 (“It is difficult to understand, however, how [Pollack’s] 
evidence could be decisive on the relevant question. . . . Evidence that the primary or 
most frequent usage of “progress” in the founding era was spatial or geographic does not 
answer the question as to whether that was the use made by those who framed or ratified 
the constitution.”). 
 96 See id. 
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answer that critique.  In this Comment, I agree with critics that con-
text does matter.  Likewise, I attempted to provide that context to 
further enrich the argument that “progress” means “dissemination.”  
Pollack, Hatch, and Lee assess the word “progress” in terms of what 
the word primarily meant to late eighteenth-century Americans.  This 
Comment analyzes what the word “progress” would have meant to 
those Americans, but with specific reference to the intellectual prop-
erty community. 
II.  USING PROGRESS TO INFORM MODERN POLICY-MAKING 
There are two fundamental questions underlying any patent sys-
tem:  Should there be a patent system?  And if so, what ends should 
that system serve? 
Of course, the Framers were presented with these questions at the 
Constitutional Convention.  Their answers to those questions can be 
discerned by analyzing what they left behind to guide our current 
patent system—the Intellectual Property Clause.  In this, the use of 
the term “progress” is evidence they believed that the purpose of the 
patent system was to generate a rich public domain to spark innova-
tion. 
The Framers’ answers to the question of why we should have a 
patent system can certainly provide a useful starting point for us to 
construct our own answers.  The creation of our own framework, 
whether or not it mirrors that of the Framers, is important and neces-
sary to creating a coherent policy scheme for implementing modern 
patent law.  This is especially true given the multiple possible justifica-
tions behind the patent system and the multiple proffered goals.97  
 
 97 The two primary goals are creating the incentive to innovate, see ROBERT P. MERGES, 
PETER S. MENELL & MARK A. LEMLEY, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN THE NEW 
TECHNOLOGICAL AGE 11 (4th ed. 2006) (“The principal objective of much of intellectual 
property law is the promotion of new and improved works—whether technological or ex-
pressible.”), and creating the incentive to disclose, see Grant v. Raymond, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 
218, 247 (1832) (“[A] correct specification and description of the thing discovered . . . is 
necessary in order to give the public, after the [patent term] shall expire, the advantage 
for which the privilege is allowed . . . .”).  However, the latter notion has been criticized 
by commentators who question whether scientists or other inventors scour through pat-
ent specifications hoping to come up with the next big idea.  See, e.g., Rebecca S. 
Eisenberg, Analyze This:  A Law and Economics Agenda for the Patent System, 53 VAND. L. REV. 
2081, 2093 (2000) (“Courts sometimes tout the disclosure as the quid pro quo for the 
patent monopoly, as if the reason we offer patents is to get disclosures of technologies 
that would otherwise be kept secret rather than simply to promote research and devel-
opment.  But this claim cries out for closer scrutiny.”).  However, the response is that dis-
closure does not only occur through the patent specification.  It can be achieved through 
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One can certainly imagine a situation in which these driving goals 
conflict.  For example, among the two primary goals of promoting 
improvements in technology and promoting the exchange of infor-
mation, this can occur where the acquisition of improved technologi-
cal goods is pursued so vigorously that it restricts or undercuts any in-
centives created for disclosure.  The compulsory licensing regime of 
India’s pre-2005 patent law provides a real-world illustration of such a 
policy. 
A.  A Case Study from India:  Compulsory Licensing and Local Working 
Up until 2005,98 compulsory licensing was used within India in 
combination with a local working requirement to promote the devel-
opment of a national technological base.  Under these policies, the 
Indian government required all patents to be locally worked, or in 
other words, practiced domestically.99  This meant that the patented 
items must be manufactured within India’s borders, and the resulting 
goods must be made available in Indian markets.100  Otherwise, the 
government would have the right to either revoke a non-practiced 
patent, or to issue a compulsory license to any outside party seeking 
to utilize the patent within these guidelines.101  In contrast, most 
highly developed countries, including the United States, do not in-
 
advertisements, publications, and other forms of publicity that the inventors are encour-
aged to engage in when they are confident in the strength of their legal entitlement. 
 Other justifications for the patent regime exist.  They include creating the incentive 
to commercialize inventions and creating the incentive to invest in research and devel-
opment.  See generally Suzanne Scotchmer, Standing on the Shoulders of Giants:  Cumulative 
Research and the Patent Law, 5 J. ECON. PERSP. 29 (1991) (documenting specific examples 
where commercially successful products are the result of cumulative research over long 
periods of time and arguing that creating an incentive for companies to invest in re-
search and development is the true aim of the patent laws).  Finally, it has also been es-
poused that the patent system actually benefits society by “fostering a cultural obsession 
with technological novelty.”  MERGES & DUFFY, supra note 46, at 13 (internal quotation 
marks omitted) (quoting GEORGE BASALLA, THE EVOLUTION OF TECHNOLOGY 124 
(1988)). 
 98 Thereafter, India moved into compliance with World Trade Organization (“WTO”) re-
quirements under the Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (“TRIPs”) 
agreement.  See Manjeet Kripalani, Pharma Karma:  Tougher Patent Protection Laws Are Spur-
ring Rapid Growth in New Drug Research Across India, BUS. WK., Apr. 18, 2005, at 20 (“India’s 
new patent protection law, which brings Indian legislation in line with World Trade Or-
ganization norms[,] . . . took effect in late March [2005] . . . .”).  See infra note 113 for 
more information on TRIPs. 
 99 See Srividhya Ragavan, Of the Inequals of the Uruguay Round, 10 MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 
273, 290–93 (2006) (describing India’s compulsory licensing and local workings regime). 
100 See id. 
101 See id. 
  
1186 JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW [Vol. 11:4 
 
corporate local working requirements within their patent laws.  One 
may validly obtain a patent and never practice or otherwise make use 
of it—the ongoing validity of a patent is not made contingent upon 
the use of the patent, and is not related to use in any other way.102 
The reason why local working requirements and compulsory li-
censing systems have been prevalent in India and other developing 
countries is that “local realities in underdeveloped nations cause pat-
ent regimes to operate differently than in developed nations.”103  Lo-
cal working was seen in India as necessary to enable national indus-
trialization by “minimiz[ing] importation of foreign goods.”104  This 
forced multinational corporations seeking to access the Indian mar-
ket to manufacture within India, thereby contributing to India’s in-
dustrial development by erecting factories, importing high-tech 
equipment, and training the native workforce.105 
A rational inquiry in response to these positive effects is why local 
working and compulsory licensing have not found a place in the pat-
ent laws of highly developed countries.  A much cited reason is that 
these policies have a detrimental effect upon the incentive to dis-
close.106  While local working and compulsory licensing provide assur-
ances of tangible goods within a particular country, these systems 
markedly weaken the incentive for individuals to obtain patents 
where the ability to commercialize the innovation is uncertain.  In 
highly developed countries like the United States, it can be assumed 
that this constitutes the majority of patents, as very few issued patents 
are commercially exploited.107  This number has been reported to be 
as low as 15%.108 
The reason behind this low rate of commercialization can be 
found in business practices that have developed in highly developed 
countries.  For example, it has become common practice of large 
corporations to invest in obtaining large patent portfolios.  Within a 
particular portfolio, a small number of patents, sometimes only one, 
 
102 See supra notes 90–91 and accompanying text.  This is subject to one recent exception, 
which is embodied in the Supreme Court’s decision in eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 
547 U.S. 388 (2006), discussed infra Part II.B. 
103 Ragavan, supra note 99, at 282. 
104 Id. at 286. 
105 Id. 
106 Id. at 288. 
107 See World Intellectual Property Organization, The Impact of the International Patent System on 
Developing Countries:  A Study by Getachew Mengistie, A/39/13 Add. 1, at 9 (reporting figures 
as low as 15% for the commercial utilization of patents in the United States, Canada, and 
the United Kingdom collectively). 
108 Id. 
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are commercially exploited.  The majority are used to prevent com-
petitors from developing similar products by creating a proprietary 
buffer-zone around the practiced patent or patents.109  This patent 
“real estate” is maintained to create distance between the company 
and its competitors, ensuring that the product is distinctive. 
A local working requirement would eliminate this practice.  Any 
patent obtained by a company as a proprietary place-holder could be 
immediately forfeited to a competitor because of the patent owner’s 
non-use.  Some would argue that this would be beneficial—there 
would be more options available for commercially successful products 
if competitors could commandeer commercially un-worked patents.  
However, where would these patents come from?  With this incentive 
structure at play, companies would have no reason to patent alternate 
constructions of their primary patents.  Instead, they would be en-
couraged to keep as much secret as possible.  The result is wasteful.  
For example, if a patent holder discovers an alternate way to achieve 
the same result of his or her patent, in a local workings and compul-
sory licensing scheme, it is in the patentee’s best interest to keep that 
alternative secret.  Competitors must then engage in identical re-
search to achieve the same result, resulting in an overall waste in re-
sources.110 
Also adding to the low rate of commercialization, many patents 
are obtained before a plan to commercialize a product is finalized.  
These companies simply do not know what will be profitable, what 
 
109 See LINDSAY MOORE & LESLEY CRAIG, INTELLECTUAL CAPITAL IN ENTERPRISE SUCCESS:  
STRATEGY REVISITED 128 (2008) (“[C]reating a patent thicket is . . . about deliberately 
blocking a natural path of incursion with an incremental invention.  Thus, it is under-
taken more as a defensive strategy than as the natural course of technological develop-
ment.  In some cases, the proliferation of blocking patents has become so extensive, and 
the quality of the patents created so minimal, that these patents are referred to disparag-
ingly as ‘junk patents,’ to show how they litter a technological landscape only to block 
competition without providing meaningful invention or innovation to the related tech-
nology.”); see also ANTITRUST, PATENTS AND COPYRIGHT:  EU AND US PERSPECTIVES 88 
(François Lévêque & Howard A. Shelanski eds., 2005) (describing an alternate strategy, 
called patent flooding, where a firm patents around a competitor’s technology so the 
competitor’s ability to practice that technology is limited). 
110 Coincidentally, one of the purposes of the U.S. patent system is to eliminate this waste by 
serving as a notice system.  It shows what has already been researched and developed so 
that other parties can focus on things other than what has already been done.  See Kelly 
Casey Mullally, Patent Hermeneutics:  Form and Substance in Claim Construction, 59 FLA. L. 
REV. 333, 349–50 (2007) (detailing the role that notice plays in patent law); see also 
SmithKline Beecham Corp. v. Apotex Corp., 403 F.3d 1331, 1361 n.7 (Fed. Cir. 2005) 
(“[P]ublic notice is required as a predicate to the validity of a patent.” (citing Jurgens v. 
CBK, Ltd., 80 F.3d 1566, 1570 n.2 (Fed. Cir. 1996))). 
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will be approved by the appropriate regulatory bodies such as the 
U.S. Food and Drug Administration, or what consumers will demand 
in the future.  They often seek a patent for an invention as soon as it 
is possible and continue to develop a commercial plan for the inven-
tion after the patent issues.  Not infrequently, whether a patent is ob-
tained for a product plays an integral role in determining whether 
the company moves forward with commercialization.  In such a case, 
the ability to market the product without risk of direct replication by 
competitors is valuable in itself. 
A local working requirement in these cases puts the cart before 
the horse by forcing a commercialization decision to occur before all 
of the information about the commercial potential of the product has 
been explored.  To obtain a patent, it would be necessary for compa-
nies to commit to commercializing a product without full knowledge 
of the product’s marketability.  Companies would either commit early 
without all of the necessary information or decide not to take the risk 
at all.  Either decision is inefficient because it is not well-informed.  
Companies would alternatively be encouraged to delay patenting un-
til they have finalized their commercialization plans, if at all.  Other-
wise, applying for a patent would put the company at risk of funding 
the research and development of a product it cannot reasonably 
make, only to see the patent fall into the hands of a competitor. 
Altogether, local working and compulsory licensing are detrimen-
tal to the incentive to disclose.  They create a situation where parties 
are disincentivized from patenting anything except for innovations 
that they are sure to commercialize.  The result is that the breadth of 
disclosure through the patent system is curbed.  Companies are hesi-
tant to disclose where there is a chance that this information may be 
directly commandeered by other parties.  In India, however, the 
other result of local working and compulsory licensing is that tech-
nology is brought into the country.  The incentive to innovate within 
the country’s borders is increased.  India, when faced with the choice 
between products and information, chose products.  The United 
States has largely chosen information. 
Clearly, the goals of a developing country are different than those 
of a highly developed nation.  The need for an immediate influx of 
tangible goods and of the capacity to manufacture those goods is 
more pronounced in developing countries.  That is why the local 
working requirement and compulsory licensing regime have been 
used to beneficial ends within these countries.  These countries value 
access and availability of innovative goods more than the fostering 
and development of a rich public domain that can be used to spur fu-
  
Apr. 2009] CONSISTENT PATENT LAW AND POLICY 1189 
 
ture innovation.  It can be said that they are choosing goods now, at 
the expense of goods later. 
In contrast, highly-developed countries like the United States have 
made the opposite decision.  They have largely found that a rich pub-
lic domain through disclosure corresponds to an increase in the qual-
ity and quantity of future innovation, and choose to maximize this re-
lationship.  Notably, the Indian committee charged with developing 
India’s patent law policy in 1957 attributed the American lack of local 
workings and compulsory licensing to “the immense wealth and 
abundance of resources” in the United States.111  It further concluded 
that “the United States could afford not to adopt compulsory licens-
ing in a manner that other [developing] countries could not.”112  It is 
a luxury to be able to forgo immediate availability for tangible goods 
in order to ensure future innovation. 
B.  Bringing the Case Study Home:  Compulsory Licensing in the United 
States After eBay Inc. v. MercExchange L.L.C. 
Could a local working and compulsory licensing regime occur in 
the United States?  Before addressing that question, it is notable that 
the United States has a history of being adamantly opposed to this 
possibility, at least in the positions it has taken in its international re-
lations.  During the Uruguay Round Negotiations of the Agreement 
on Trade Related-Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (“TRIPs”),113 
the United States championed the view that local workings require-
ments should be internationally banned as a part of any country’s 
patent law.114  This is in sharp contrast to the position of developing 
countries, which almost uniformly wanted local working require-
 
111 Ragavan, supra note 99, at 288. 
112 Id. 
113 These negotiations gave rise to TRIPs, a treaty that seeks to harmonize patent laws inter-
nationally in order to make them more accessible to multinational corporations and 
other international patent-seekers.  See Christopher S. Mayer, Comment, The Brazilian 
Pharmaceutical Industry Goes Walking from Ipanema to Prosperity:  Will the New Intellectual Prop-
erty Law Spur Domestic Investment?, 12 TEMP. INT’L & COMP. L.J. 377, 380–81 (1998) (“The 
primary impetus of TRIPS was to bring various developing countries such as China, India, 
and Brazil into compliance with minimal intellectual property standards.”).  For a general 
review of TRIPs, see DUNCAN MATTHEWS, GLOBALISING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS:  
THE TRIPS AGREEMENT (2002). 
114 See Paul Champ & Amir Attaran, Patent Rights and Local Working Under the WTO TRIPS 
Agreement:  An Analysis of the U.S.-Brazil Patent Dispute, 27 YALE J. INT’L L. 365, 369 (“The 
United States was almost alone  . . . [in] seeking to bar any possible obligation or remedy 
there might be for a patentee’s failure to work locally.”). 
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ments “to be a mandatory obligation of any patentee.”115  The United 
States was also of the view that compulsory licensing should be “to-
tally barred . . . as a remedy for a patentee’s failure to work locally.”116 
1.  eBay, Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C. 
Developments in United States patent law following the recent 
Supreme Court decision in eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C.117 stand in 
stark contrast to the American position in TRIPs.  Before eBay, the 
Federal Circuit had consistently held that the proper relief for patent 
law infringement was an injunction.118  Only in the most extenuating 
circumstances would equitable relief, such as a compulsory license, 
be justified.119  The Supreme Court’s decision in eBay completely al-
tered these conditions, holding instead that it is inappropriate to 
categorically grant injunctive relief whenever there is patent in-
fringement.120  Instead, the Court asserted that courts must apply a 
four-factor test in determining what type of relief will be available in 
each particular case.  To obtain injunctive relief under eBay, a pat-
entee must show: 
(1) that it has suffered an irreparable injury; (2) that remedies available 
at law, such as monetary damages, are inadequate to compensate for that 
injury; (3) that, considering the balance of hardships between the plain-
 
115 Id. 
116 Id. at 375.  The ultimate result was a compromise:  a general rule against local working 
and compulsory licensing was established, as were several exceptions to this rule. 
117 547 U.S. 388 (2006). 
118 See Richardson v. Suzuki Motor Co., 868 F.2d 1226, 1247 (Fed. Cir. 1989) (“It is the gen-
eral rule that an injunction will issue when infringement has been adjudged, absent a 
sound reason for denying it.”). 
119 See MercExchange, L.L.C. v. eBay, Inc., 401 F.3d 1323, 1338–39 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (outlin-
ing a general rule in which “courts will issue permanent injunctions against patent in-
fringement absent exceptional circumstances”), vacated, 547 U.S. 388 (2006).  For exam-
ples of extenuating circumstances that have justified such relief in the past, see infra notes 
136–38 and accompanying text. 
120 eBay, 547 U.S. at 393–94.  The jury had found willful infringement on the part of the de-
fendants and awarded MercExchange $35 million in damages.  MercExchange, L.L.C. v. 
eBay, Inc., 275 F. Supp. 2d 695, 698–99 (E.D. Va. 2003), rev’d in part, 401 F.3d 1323 (Fed. 
Cir. 2005), vacated, 547 U.S. 388 (2006).  The district court lowered this number slightly 
to $29.5 million and refused to enjoin further patent infringement despite the plaintiff’s 
request for an injunction.  Id. at 710–15, 722.  The case was appealed to the Federal Cir-
cuit, where the court reversed the district court’s decision not to issue an injunction, 
holding instead that “[b]ecause the ‘right to exclude recognized in a patent is but the es-
sence of the concept of property,’ the general rule is that a permanent injunction will is-
sue once infringement and validity have been adjudged.”  MercExchange, 401 F.3d at 1338 
(quoting Richardson, 868 F.2d at 1246–47). 
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tiff and defendant, a remedy in equity is warranted; and (4) that the pub-
lic interest would not be disserved by a permanent injunction.121 
If the plaintiff does not satisfy these criteria, equitable relief, includ-
ing compulsory licensing, is appropriate.122 
Two concurring opinions were issued in eBay.  Chief Justice Rob-
erts’s concurrence, joined by Justices Scalia and Ginsburg, suggested 
that the application of the four-factor test should still result in the is-
suance of an injunction in the wide majority of patent infringement 
cases.123  He noted that “[w]hen it comes to discerning and applying 
[the four factor test], in this area as others, ‘a page of history is worth 
a volume of logic.’”124 
Justice Kennedy’s concurrence, joined by Justices Stevens, Souter, 
and Breyer, suggested that new types of patents and forms of in-
fringement may alter the nature of a court’s analysis under the four-
part test.125  In particular, he stated that for non-practicing entities, 
courts should consider the role that the infringing component plays 
in the overall scheme of a product.126  This part of the opinion is 
worth quoting as a reference for the next subsection: 
An industry has developed in which firms use patents not as a basis for 
producing and selling goods but, instead, primarily for obtaining licens-
ing fees.  For these firms, an injunction, and the potentially serious sanc-
tions arising from its violation, can be employed as a bargaining tool to 
charge exorbitant fees to companies that seek to buy licenses to practice 
the patent.  When the patented invention is but a small component of 
the product the companies seek to produce and the threat of an injunc-
tion is employed simply for undue leverage in negotiations, legal dam-
ages may well be sufficient to compensate for the infringement and an in-
junction may not serve the public interest.127 
 
121 eBay, 547 U.S. at 391. 
122 Id. at 391–93. 
123 See id. at 394–95 (Roberts, C.J., concurring) (“From at least the early 19th century, courts 
have granted injunctive relief upon a finding of infringement in the vast majority of pat-
ent cases.  This long tradition of equity practice is not surprising, given the difficulty of 
protecting a right to exclude through monetary remedies that allow an infringer to use an 
invention against the patentee’s wishes—a difficulty that often implicates the first two fac-
tors of the traditional four-factor test.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
124 Id. at 395 (quoting N.Y. Trust Co. v. Eisner, 256 U.S. 345, 349 (1921)). 
125 Id. at 395–96 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (“In cases now arising trial courts should bear in 
mind that in many instances the nature of the patent being enforced and the economic 
function of the patent holder present considerations quite unlike earlier cases.”). 
126 Id. at 396–97. 
127 Id. (citations omitted). 
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Justice Kennedy also warned against liberally issuing injunctions 
for business method patents.128  He stated that their “vagueness and 
suspect validity . . . may affect the calculus under the four-factor 
test.”129 
2.  The Legacy of eBay, Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C. 
What is interesting for the purposes of this Comment is not the 
eBay decision itself, but the field of patent law after eBay.  Lower 
courts responding to the decision have largely continued to issue in-
junctions after finding that the patentee has satisfied the require-
ments of eBay’s four-factor test.130  However, among courts that have 
denied injunctions and have issued licenses instead, “the single factor 
that [they] look to most often to support [their decisions] is the pat-
entee’s failure to commercially practice the patented invention.”131  
Suspiciously, this practice looks very similar to compulsory licensing 
in response to a lack of local working, the exact thing that the United 
States was trying to place an international ban on during the Uruguay 
Round of the TRIPs negotiations.132 
To date, there have been twenty-nine decisions issuing an injunc-
tion,133 and fourteen decisions denying one.134  In contrast, before 
 
128 Id. (“[I]njunctive relief may have different consequences for the burgeoning number of 
patents over business methods . . . .”). 
129 Id. at 397. 
130 See Christopher A. Cotropia, Compulsory Licensing Under TRIPS and the Supreme Court of the 
United States’ Decision in eBay v. MercExchange, in PATENT LAW AND THEORY:  A 
HANDBOOK OF CONTEMPORARY RESEARCH 570 (Toshiko Takenaka ed., 2008) (reporting 
that “[m]ost courts after eBay are still issuing permanent injunctions, with a permanent 
injunction currently being issued at the rate of three cases for every case that denies an 
injunction”). 
131 Id.  Cotropia cited the following court decisions as examples of situations when courts 
have looked towards a failure to commercially exploit a patent as a reason for denying a 
permanent injunction:  Visto Corp. v. Seven Networks, Inc., No. 2:03–CV–333–TJW, 2006 
WL 3741981, at *4 (E.D. Tex. Dec. 19, 2006); Paice LLC v. Toyota Motor Corp., No. 2:04–
CV–211–DF, 2006 WL 2385139, at *5 (E.D. Tex. Aug. 16, 2006), aff’d in part, vacated in 
part on other grounds, 504 F.3d 1293 (Fed. Cir. 2007); z4 Techs., Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 
434 F. Supp. 2d 437, 440–41 (E.D. Tex. 2006).  Id. at 570, n.77. 
132 See notes 114, 116 and accompanying text. 
133 These cases include:  Verizon Servs. Corp. v. Vonage Holdings Corp., 503 F.3d 1295 (Fed. 
Cir. 2007); Unitronics (1989) (R “ G) Ltd. v. Gharb, 532 F. Supp. 2d 25 (D.D.C. 2008); 
Acumed LLC v. Stryker Corp., No. 04-513, 2007 WL 4180682 (D. Or. Nov. 20, 2007); 
Martek Biosciences Corp. v. Nutrinova Inc., 520 F. Supp. 2d 537 (D. Del. 2007); Sun-
dance, Inc. v. Demonte Fabricating Ltd., No. 02-73543, 2007 WL 3053662 (E.D. Mich. 
Oct. 19, 2007); Baden Sports, Inc. v. Kabushiki Kaisha Molten, No. 06-210, 2007 WL 
2790777 (W.D. Wash. Sept. 25, 2007); Johns Hopkins Univ. v. Datascope Corp., 513 F. 
Supp. 2d 578 (D. Md. 2007); Allan Block Corp. v. E. Dillon & Co., 509 F. Supp. 2d 795 
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eBay, denials of injunctions were “essentially non-existent.”135  This 
point deserves further discussion.  The automatic conferral of injunc-
tive relief before eBay was so settled that the Federal Circuit declared 
that “courts have in rare instances exercised their discretion to deny 
injunctive relief in order to protect the public interest.”136  Cases 
where the public interest weighed so heavily against an injunction 
such that a denial was appropriate included a case where an injunc-
tion would have cut off the supply of medical supply test kits that 
 
(D. Minn. 2007); 800 Adept, Inc. v. Murex Sec., Ltd., 505 F. Supp. 2d 1327 (M.D. Fla. 
2007); MPT, Inc. v. Marathon Labels, Inc., 505 F. Supp. 2d 401 (N.D. Ohio 2007); MGM 
Well Servs., Inc. v. Mega Lift Sys., L.L.C., 505 F. Supp. 2d 359 (S.D. Tex. 2007); Muniauc-
tion, Inc. v. Thomson Corp., 502 F. Supp. 2d 477 (W.D. Pa. 2007); Commonwealth Scien-
tific & Indus. Research Org. v. Buffalo Tech. Inc., 492 F. Supp. 2d 600 (E.D. Tex. 2007); 
Sanofi-Synthelabo v. Apotex Inc., 492 F. Supp. 2d 353 (S.D.N.Y. 2007); Brooktrout, Inc. v. 
Eicon Networks Corp., No. 03-59, 2007 WL 1730112 (E.D. Tex. June 14, 2007); O2 Micro 
Int’l Ltd. v. Beyond Innovation Tech. Co., No. 04-32, 2007 WL 869576 (E.D. Tex. Mar. 21, 
2007); Ortho-McNeil Pharm., Inc. v. Mylan Labs. Inc., 2007 WL 869545 (D.N.J. Mar. 20, 
2007); Novozymes A/S v. Genencor Int’l, Inc., 474 F. Supp. 2d 592 (D. Del. 2007); Trans-
ocean Offshore Deepwater Drilling, Inc. v. GlobalSantaFe Corp., No. 03-2910, 2006 WL 
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were used ubiquitously in hospitals,137 and another where an injunc-
tion would force the City of Milwaukee to dump raw sewage into Lake 
Michigan.138  Clearly, eBay has had a marked result on lower court de-
cisions, as the number of cases where a district court has denied a 
motion for a permanent injunction is not insubstantial as it had been 
in the past.  It is too soon to definitively tell, but it appears that Chief 
Justice Roberts’s prediction—that injunctions will largely continue to 
issue in the same proportion as before the eBay decision—was inaccu-
rate. 
Moreover, it looks as if lower courts have looked towards Justice 
Kennedy’s concurrence for guidance.  The district court’s opinion in 
Paice LLC v. Toyota Motor Corp.139 provides a good example.  The case 
involved a patent for a hybrid electric vehicle drive train that was is-
sued to a non-practicing entity, Paice LLC.  The jury found that Toy-
ota had infringed Paice’s patent in some of its Toyota Prius, Toyota 
Highlander, and Lexis RX 400h models.140  The plaintiff made a mo-
tion for a permanent injunction.  After applying the four-factor test 
consistent with eBay, the district court denied the motion.  The case 
presented the precise fact pattern that Justice Kennedy had warned 
district courts against.  Paice was a non-practicing entity using its pat-
ent “not as a basis for producing and selling goods but, instead, pri-
marily for obtaining licensing fees.”141  Moreover, the patented inven-
tion was “but a small component of the product the [defendant 
sought] to produce.”142  The district court did not explicitly say so, but 
it would not have been surprising if in its decision, it had continued 
down this path and concluded, quoting eBay, that there was a threat 
that an “injunction [would be] employed [to the effect of giving the 
plaintiff] undue leverage in negotiations,” and that therefore “legal 
damages [were] sufficient to compensate for the infringement,” and 
finally that “an injunction [did] not serve the public interest.”143 
What the district court did determine in applying eBay’s four fac-
tor test was that “the patentee’s failure to produce and sell the pat-
ented component or compete with Toyota meant that any future 
 
137 Hybritech, Inc. v. Abbott Labs., No. AK (PX), CV 86-7461, 1987 WL 123997 (C.D. Cal. 
July 14, 1987), aff’d, 849 F.2d 1446 (Fed. Cir. 1988). 
138 City of Milwaukee v. Activated Sludge, Inc., 69 F.2d 577 (7th Cir. 1934). 
139 No. 2:04–CV–211–DF, 2006 WL 2385139 (E.D. Tex. Aug. 16, 2006), aff’d in part, vacated in 
part on other grounds, 504 F.3d 1293 (Fed. Cir. 2007). 
140 Paice LLC v. Toyota Motor Corp., 504 F.3d 1293, 1299 (Fed Cir. 2007). 
141 eBay, Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 338, 396 (2006) (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
142 Id. 
143 Id. at 396–97. 
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harm from Toyota’s infringement was easily remedied by a damage 
award.”144  The district court fixated on the fact that the “[p]laintiff 
[did] not compete for market share with the accused vehicles, [and] 
concerns regarding loss of brand name recognition and market share 
similarly [were] not implicated.”145  It further held that “[f]or these 
reasons, [p]laintiff has not demonstrated that it [would] suffer ir-
reparable harm in the absence of an injunction.”146 
The court used the same consideration in determining the bal-
ances of the hardships factor.  To shape its inquiry, the court focused 
on the fact that the defendant actually practiced the (infringed) pat-
ent and the fact that the plaintiff did not.  The district court stated 
that issuing an injunction would 
ignore[] the reality that two of the accused vehicles were introduced to 
the market during the 2006 model year and enjoining their sales [would] 
likely interrupt not only Defendants’ business but that of the related 
businesses, such as dealers and suppliers. . . . And the Court [found] that 
enjoining Defendants [would] damage their reputation.147 
In terms of damage to the plaintiff, the only factor that the court 
considered was whether the plaintiff would go out of business if an 
injunction did not issue.148  Finding that this was not a convincing 
threat, the court ruled that “the balance of hardships tip[ped] decid-
edly in favor of [d]efendants.”149  Notably, this language is not un-
usual post-eBay.150 
Thus, local working was directly implicated in two of the four fac-
tors in the eBay test.  Commentators have noted that “[t]he courts all 
go through the four-factor analysis in an attempt to stay true to the 
holding in eBay.  But the practical effect is that this single fact—lack 
of commercialization—dictates the result in most cases.”151  While the 
non-working of a patent will not automatically result in a compulsory 
license under eBay,152 it is notable that local working does play a sig-
nificant role in the determination. 
 
144 Cotropia, supra note 130, at 570. 
145 Paice, 2006 WL 2385139, at *5. 
146 Id. 
147 Id. 
148 Id. 
149 Id. 
150 Cotropia, supra note 130, at 571 (“Other district courts have followed a similar analysis 
after eBay [as that in Paice], focusing on the patentee’s failure to practice the patented in-
vention to justify a denial of a permanent injunction.”). 
151 Id. 
152 This result would be contrary to Continental Paper Bag Co. v. Eastern Paper Bag Co., 210 U.S. 
405 (1908).  Notably, Continental Bag’s primary holding was affirmed in eBay.  eBay Inc. v. 
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Commentators have criticized eBay based on this result.  For ex-
ample, Janice Mueller wrote: 
One of the more controversial aspects of the current U.S. patent law re-
form movement is whether the availability of injunctive relief in cases of 
patent infringement should depend in some measure upon whether the 
patent owner itself is manufacturing the patented invention.  Some re-
form proponents would prevent a non-manufacturing “patent troll” from 
obtaining injunctive relief against infringers. This too is a form of domes-
tic working requirement, or at least a differential treatment of those who 
do not work their patents. It would be rather ironic if the U.S. were to 
challenge India’s domestic working requirements while at the same time 
contemplating a partial abrogation of remedies available to its own non-
working patentees.153 
Others have found that while the United States may still be in com-
pliance with the TRIPs even after eBay, the decision may still “impact 
the credibility of the United States’ strong stance against compulsory 
licensing by other Member States.”154 
3.  Curing the Confusion with “Progress” 
What happened in eBay and what has happened since eBay are 
prime examples of what may occur when patent law is not structured 
according to a set of organized principles.  Inconsistent policies are 
instituted, in this case potentially bringing American patent law into 
non-compliance with its international obligations.  Additionally, it is 
highly likely that this new emphasis on commercialization as a crite-
rion for whether or not injunctive relief is appropriate may chill the 
incentive for inventors and businesses to disclose their innovations.155 
While this Comment does not take a strong position for or against 
compulsory licensing in the United States, it does take the position 
that there needs to be a better mechanism for achieving uniformity 
 
MercExchange L.L.C., 547 U.S. 338, 393 (2006).  After eBay, there have been instances 
where a lower court allowed an injunction to issue notwithstanding the patentee’s failure 
to practice the patent.  See Commonwealth Scientific & Indus. Research Org. v. Buffalo 
Tech. Inc., 492 F. Supp. 2d 600 (E.D. Tex. 2007); see also Cotropia, supra note 130, at 569 
(“[A] Patentee’s lack of commercial practice of the patented technology does not auto-
matically deny an injunction.  On the other side, a finding of patent infringement does 
not automatically result in a grant of an injunction.” (emphases added) (footnote omit-
ted)). 
153 Janice M. Mueller, The Tiger Awakens:  The Tumultuous Transformation of India’s Patent Sys-
tem and the Rise of Indian Pharmaceutical Innovation, 68 U. PITT. L. REV. 491, 597 (2007). 
154 Cotropia, supra note 130, at 582. 
155 Data will have to be obtained to definitively determine whether there is such an impact.  
However, it is highly likely that such a result is occurring, especially in the case of increas-
ingly patent-savvy corporations. 
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among American patent policies.  One way this Comment proposes 
that these objectives can be achieved is through elaborating on which 
goals the patent laws are supposed to achieve, and in which order 
those goals are to be priorities.  This Comment suggests that one way 
to determine that priority is by looking towards the Constitution, 
which directs that the purpose of patent law is the promotion of 
“progress,” “progress” of course meaning “dissemination.” 
CONCLUSION 
“In the absence of a guiding principle, the choices made are, at best, in-
consistent. . . . At worst, the absence of a guiding principle fosters arbi-
trariness or prejudice.”156 
The laws governing the United States patent system are currently 
in a considerable state of flux.  Congress is currently considering the 
Patent Reform Act,157 a bill which would significantly reshape the pro-
cedures concerning patent prosecution and litigation, if passed.  
Moreover, the Supreme Court has recently taken a notable and re-
newed interest in patent law jurisprudence.158 
During times of change, it becomes increasingly important for 
those responsible for the creation of policy, law, and doctrine to be 
committed to furthering the fundamental goals of the intellectual 
property system.  In this case, the patent law policy goals summarized 
in the preceding text, namely the creation of incentives to innovate 
and disclose, have been advanced in the past.  However, these goals 
sometimes conflict because they each prioritize various aspects of the 
system differently.  An examination of current judicial opinions, 
commentary, and policy papers demonstrates that those in charge of 
making patent law policy lack a uniform approach to determining 
which goals to pursue in different instances.159  Specific policy goals 
are paraded around when they are in accordance with a decision, but 
there is no mention of them when they are inconvenient.  The result 
is arbitrary and inconsistent, as demonstrated by America’s adamant 
insistence that compulsory licensing in patent law should be banned 
as a condition to membership in the WTO, while the Supreme Court 
 
156 Paul H. Robinson, Hybrid Principles for the Distribution of Criminal Sanctions, 82 NW. U. L. 
REV. 19, 20 (1988). 
157 H.R. 1908, 110th Cong. (2007); S. 1145, 110th Cong. (2007). 
158 See generally, John F. Duffy, The Festo Decision and the Return of the Supreme Court to the Bar of 
Patents, 2002 SUP. CT. REV. 273 (2002). 
159 See, e.g., supra notes 11–12, 16, 19, and accompanying text. 
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develops a regime suspiciously similar to compulsory licensing to be 
applied by American courts. 
This Comment argues that where policy goals conflict, it is impor-
tant for decision makers to have a method of determining which ob-
jectives to follow at the expense of others.  However, this suggestion is 
admittedly demanding—how will patent law policymakers select what 
fundamental goals to favor over the others, and in which order?  This 
Comment proposes that one way priorities can be set is by looking 
towards the Constitution and what the Framers believed to be the 
most important purpose of the intellectual property systems.  These 
aims can be discerned through the Intellectual Property Clause and 
clues embedded within the wording of the Clause.  In doing so, it 
should be noted that the best meaning of the word “progress” as it is 
used in the Intellectual Property Clause is “dissemination.”  Referenc-
ing back to the policy goals for intellectual property regimes, the 
Framers’ objectives, characterized as dissemination, are best repre-
sented by the policy goal of incentivizing disclosure.  Thus, this 
Comment proffers this policy goal as what intellectual property law 
should be emphasizing.  Even if this is inconsistent with the purpose 
we see for intellectual property today, this is at least a meaningful 
starting point for the discussion. 
The point is not that any one principle is correct to the exclusion 
of others.  Certainly, intellectual property may strive to achieve mul-
tiple goals and is arguably strengthened by having the benefit of mul-
tiple perspectives.160  As Henry Hart observes in a different context, 
“[s]ocial purposes can never be single or simple, or held unquali-
fiedly to the exclusion of all other social purposes; and an effort to 
make them so can result only in the sacrifice of other values which 
also are important.”161  Instead, the argument made here is that to 
create a coherent intellectual property policy, we must define how 
these goals interact, discern areas where they may conflict, and create 
a method of prioritizing some goals over others to help guide us in 
deciding what to do when there is conflict.  And in doing so, we 
should ask ourselves:  Are we making progress? 
 
 
160 Cf. Henry M. Hart, Jr., The Aims of the Criminal Law, 23 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 401 
(1958) (discussing the necessity and virtue of having multiple policy goals in mind when 
framing criminal law policies). 
161 Id. at 401. 
